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Article

Volume 53 • Number 4

October 2015



 

 

Knowing What One Believes—In Defense of a Dispositional Reliabilist Extrospective Account


by Michael Roche

Abstract

We seem to enjoy a special kind of access to our beliefs. We seem able to know about them via a distinctively first-personal method, and such knowledge seems epistemically superior to any knowledge that others might attain of our beliefs. This paper defends a novel account of this access. The account is extrospective in that it explains this access in terms of our ability to think about the (non-mental) world. Moreover, it does not require the contentious claim that judging that p suffices for coming to believe that p. This is a significant strength of the account.


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ISSN: 2152-1123