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Article

Volume 53 • Number 2

April 2015



 

 

The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism


by Bryan Frances

Abstract

Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin-Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and, more importantly, it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.


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ISSN: 2152-1123