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Volume 53 • Number 2

April 2015



Know-wh Does Not Reduce to Know-That

by Katalin Farkas


Know-wh (knowing what, where, etc.) ascriptions are ubiquitous in many languages. One standard analysis of know-wh is this: someone knows-wh just in case she knows that p, where p is an answer to the question included in the wh-clause. Additional conditions have also been proposed, but virtually all analyses assume that propositional knowledge of an answer is at least a necessary condition for knowledge-wh (even if it is not sufficient). This paper challenges this assumption by arguing that there are cases where we have knowledge-wh without knowledge-that of an answer, for example, in the cases familiar from arguments for the Extended Mind Hypothesis.

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ISSN: 2152-1123