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Volume 53 • Number 1

January 2016



Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited

by Christoph Kelp


In Kelp (2009a), it is argued that there are epistemic Frankfurt cases that serve to show that knowledge does not require safety from error. In this paper, these Frankfurt cases are revisited. It is first argued that a recent response to the earlier argument by Duncan Pritchard remains unsatisfactory. Then it is shown that Frankfurt cases impact a much wider range of accounts. Specifically, it is argued in some detail that, in conjunction with the infamous Fake Barn cases, they generate a problem for the two most prominent virtue theoretic accounts of knowledge, due to Ernest Sosa and John Greco.

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ISSN: 2152-1123