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Article

Volume 52 • Number 3

July 2015



 

 

Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons


by Dustin Locke


According to a number of recent philosophers, knowledge has an intimate relationship with rationality. Some philosophers hold, in particular, that rational agents do things for good motivating reasons, and that p can be one's motivating reason for ϕ-ing only if one knows that p. This paper argues against the latter view and in favor of the view that p cannot be one's motivating reason for ϕ-ing—in the relevant sense—unless there is an appropriate explanatory connection between the fact that p and one's ϕ-ing. I argue that this view offers a better account of the cases alleged to support the knowledge view.


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ISSN: 2152-1123