List journal issues    
 
 
Home List journal issues Table of contents Subscribe to APQ

Article

Volume 52 • Number 1

January 2015



 

 

Russellian Panpsychism: Too Good to Be True?


by Patrick Kuehner Lewtas

Abstract

Russellian panpsychism puts basic conscious properties at the bottom level and then grounds lowestlevel physical entities in them. This paper offers arguments against the view. (1) The explanatory gap cuts both ways, making it as hard to get the physical out of consciousness as to get consciousness out of the physical. (2) Russellian panpsychism can't explain how basic conscious properties yield high-level consciousness. (3) Other non-physicalist views can evade the causal argument for physicalism at least as well as Russellian panpsychism. (4) Simplicity and beauty don't supply reasons for Russellian panpsychism.


view PDF
 

 

 

 
Home | Issue Index
 
© 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Content in American Philosophical Quarterly is intended for personal, noncommercial use only. You may not reproduce, publish, distribute, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, modify, create derivative works from, display, or in any way exploit the American Philosophical Quarterly database in whole or in part without the written permission of the copyright holder.

American Philosophical Quarterly is published by the University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications.

ISSN: 2152-1123