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Volume 51 • Number 4

October 2014



A Defense of Lucretianism

by Brannon McDaniel

1. The Truth-Supervenes-on-Being Thesis

According to the presentist, it is always the case that the only existing objects are those that exist at the present time, and the only properties and relations that are instantiated are those that are instantiated at the present time. A wholly non-present object is one that, roughly, exists at some past times or future times, but does not exist at the present time. Presentism implies that there are no wholly non-present objects.

It is often thought that truth must depend on the world, and that the correct account of this dependence is given in terms of supervenience. More specifically, to claim that truth depends on the world is to claim that truth supervenes on being (Keller 2004, p. 85; Lewis 1992, pp. 218–219; Merricks 2007, chap. 4; Sider 2001, p. 36). There are multiple ways to understand the thesis that truth supervenes on being. Although we will have reason to modify it as we proceed, let us begin by discussing a fairly straightforward version of this thesis:

There can be no difference in what is true without a corresponding difference in what exists and in what properties and relations are instantiated.

Call this the truth-supervenes-on-being thesis (TSB).

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ISSN: 2152-1123