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Volume 51 • Number 3

July 2014



On Experiencing High-Level Properties

by Indrek Reiland

Which properties can we perceptually experience? Some philosophers have held that we can perceptually experience only the following "low-level" properties, that only these can make a difference to what it is like to have perceptual experiences: color properties, illumination properties, motion properties, shape properties, and spatial location properties for visual experience, volume, pitch, and timbre for auditory experience, sweetness, sourness for gustatory experience, and so on (Byrne 2009; Carruthers and Veillet 2012; Dretske 1995; Lyons 2005; Price 2006; Smith 2002; Tye 1995). Others have held that we can also perceptually experience the following "highlevel" properties, that these can also make a difference to what it is like to have perceptual experiences: natural kind properties like being a pine tree or being a tomato, functional kind properties like being a stethoscope or being a cathode ray tube, and even semantic properties (Bayne 2009; Fish 2009; Johnston 2004, 2006; Masrour 2011; McDowell 1994; Nanay 2011; Peacocke 1992; Searle 1983; Siegel 2006, 2011; Siewert 1998).

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ISSN: 2152-1123