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Volume 51 • Number 3

July 2014



 

 

Inferential Evidence


by Jeffrey Dunn


Consider:

The Evidence Question: When, and under what conditions does an agent have proposition E as evidence (at t)?

Timothy Williamson's (2000) answer to this question is the well-known E = K thesis:

E = K: E is a member of S's evidence set at t iff S knows E at t.

I will argue that this answer is inconsistent with the version of Bayesianism that Williamson advocates. This is because E = K allows an agent to garner evidence via inductive inference whereas standard Bayesian views disallow such a thing. Since Williamson's version of Bayesianism shares the key features with the standard Bayesian view, there is an inconsistency.


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ISSN: 2152-1123