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Volume 51 • Number 3

July 2014



A Menagerie of Duties? Normative Judgements are not Beliefs about Non-Natural Properties

by Matthew S. Bedke

To be a cognitivist or to be a non-cognitivist? That is one question. According to normative cognitivism, the propositional attitude featured in any substantive normative judgment is a standard belief about what things are like. So, for example, just as my judgment that the peak of Mt. Everest is in Nepal is a standard belief about how the world is with respect to the location of a mountaintop, my judgment that stepping on your gouty toes was wrong is a standard belief about how the world was with respect to the moral status of an action. I will assume that such judgments are about what things are like in a non-deflationary, metaphysically committed sense. And I will use the term "belief" to pick out such judgments.

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ISSN: 2152-1123