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Volume 51 • Number 2

April 2014



Representing Oneself as Knowing

by Christopher McCammon

Lots of epistemologists nowadays think there is an intimate connection between assertion and knowledge.1 Talk of this connection is largely oriented around Timothy Williamson’s claim that you shouldn’t assert p unless you know p. Hereafter, I will render this claim as follows: (KNA) Don’t assert that p unless so asserting expresses your knowledge that p.2 (KNA) is for “Knowledge Norm of Assertion.”

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ISSN: 2152-1123