List journal issues    
 
 
Home List journal issues Table of contents Subscribe to APQ

Article

Volume 51 • Number 2

April 2014



 

 

In Defense of a Temporal Account of Betterness


by Bennett Foddy


In “The Metaphysics of Harm,” Matthew Hanser (2008) claims that there are three accounts of harm that are currently vying for dominance in the philosophical literature. On “counterfactual comparison” accounts, a person is harmed by an event if it causes her to be worse-off than she would have otherwise been. On “temporal comparison” accounts, a person is harmed by an event if it causes her to be worse-off than she previously was. And on “non-comparative” accounts, a person is harmed if she is in some state that is bad compared to some impersonal standard or norm.


view PDF
 

 

 

 
Home | Issue Index
 
© 2014 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Content in American Philosophical Quarterly is intended for personal, noncommercial use only. You may not reproduce, publish, distribute, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, modify, create derivative works from, display, or in any way exploit the American Philosophical Quarterly database in whole or in part without the written permission of the copyright holder.

American Philosophical Quarterly is published by the University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications.

ISSN: 2152-1123