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Volume 50 • Number 2

April 2013



 

 

On the Limits of Virtue Epistemology


by Joshue Orozco


Since Ernest Sosa's (1980) seminal paper, a variety of views on the nature of intellectual virtues and their role in one's epistemic theory have emerged. These views, including Sosa's original, largely draw from moral counterparts for their motivation, articulation, and defense. Consider two broad accounts of intellectual virtues:

Consequentialist Conception (CC): An intellectual virtue is a stable disposition, ability, or power to reliably acquire epistemic goods (e.g., true belief and knowledge).

Aristotelian Conception (AC): An intellectual virtue is a character trait involving an underlying psychological and behavioral structure directed at various epistemic goods.


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ISSN: 2152-1123