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Article

Volume 50 • Number 2

April 2013



 

 

The Suportive Reasons Norm of Assertion


by Rachel McKinnon


In this paper I present my proposal for the central norm governing the practice of assertion, which I call the Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion (SRNA). I argue that by properly understanding the relationship between the goal of assertion and its nature as a social practice, we can recognize that there are conventional and pragmatic features internal to the practice. These internal features should be made explicit in our articulation of the norm, and not treated as inessential to it. This feature of my view sets it apart from other extant proposals of reasonsbased norms such as Jennifer Lackey's Reasonable-to-Believe Norm of Assertion (RTBNA) and Igor Douven's Rational Credibility Rule (RCR). While I cannot present a full defense of the norm—considering how it handles various data such as Moore's Paradox and "How do you know?"—I offer a preliminary defense as a launching point for future arguments.


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ISSN: 2152-1123