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Volume 50 • Number 1

January 2013



 

 

2013 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology, and Belief- Contravening Commitments


by Michael J. Shaffer


A number of epistemologists have defended doxastic voluntarism, the view that we have voluntary control over what we believe. Defenders of this view allow then for the possibility that we can voluntarily commit ourselves to propositions. This appears to include belief-contravening propositions. Typically, belief-contravening commitments are themselves taken to be beliefs. Thus, these defenders of doxastic voluntarism allow that we can at least sometimes efficaciously choose to believe propositions that are negatively implicated by our evidence. One of the main reasons that doxastic voluntarism enjoys a degree of popularity is that it is supposed to allow for the evaluation of an agent's epistemic status from a deontological perspective.


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American Philosophical Quarterly is published by the University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications.

ISSN: 2152-1123