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Article

Volume 49 • Number 2

April 2012



 

 

Rational Epistemic Akrasia


by Allen Coates


Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. There is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, but this article will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. More precisely, the article will consider whether cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one's judgment of it are epistemically rational.


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American Philosophical Quarterly is published by the University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications.

ISSN: 2152-1123