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Article

Volume 49 • Number 2

April 2012



 

 

How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent


by Roger Clarke


A prominent criticism of compatibilist theories of moral responsibility is that they do not deal adequately with cases of manipulation, and particularly with induced desires. So, for example, accounts that give the conditions for responsibility in terms of the reasons-responsiveness of the mechanism governing one's decisions, as Fischer and Ravizza (1998) do, seem to leave the door open to cases such as the following.


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ISSN: 2152-1123