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Article

Volume 49 • Number 1

January 2012



 

 

Expressivism and Dispositional Desires


by Caj Strandberg


According to a persistent objection against metaethical expressivism, this view is committed to a strong version of internalism that is unable to account for cases where a person's moral judgment and motivation come apart. Recently, leading expressivists have argued that they can meet this objection by maintaining that moral judgments consist in noncognitive states that motivate in normal conditions. In this article, it is maintained that an important dimension of internalism has, on the whole, gone unnoticed: internalist claims vary depending on whether moral judgments and motivation are understood as dispositional states or occurrent states. This variation can be invoked in an argument showing that expressivists are indeed committed to versions of internalism that make it impossible to account for cases in which moral judgment and motivation diverge.


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ISSN: 2152-1123