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Article

Volume 48 • Number 2

April 2011



 

 

Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument


by David Papineau


In this essay I want to consider whether the “phenomenal concepts” posited by many recent philosophers of mind are consistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. The essay will have three sections. In the first, I shall explain the rationale for positing phenomenal concepts. In the second, I shall argue that phenomenal concepts are indeed inconsistent with the private language argument. In the last, I shall ask whether this is bad for phenomenal concepts or bad for Wittgenstein.


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ISSN: 2152-1123