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Article

Volume 47 • Number 4

October 2010



 

 

AN ARGUMENT FOR NONREDUCTIVE
REPRESENTATIONALISM


by Richard Gray


1. Representationalism, Reductionism, and Externalism

"Representationalism," as the term is currently most widely used in the philosophy of perception, refers to the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on the intentional (or representational) content of experience. Therefore, representationalism, minimally, is the view that the character of experience depends on its content such that whenever the content of an experience is the same as another token experience, the character of experience will be the same. But representationalism has been developed in a number of ways. Perhaps the most widely held version of representationalism is a strong form of representationalism, according to which the character of experience does not merely supervene on its content, it is identical to its content. It is the proper construal of this form of representationalism that will be the topic of the present article.


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ISSN: 2152-1123