|
Against Logical Versions
of the Direct Argument:
A New Counterexample
by Seth Shabo
In An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen
(1983) presented an intuitively compelling
inference principle that has come to be known
as "Transfer NR" (Transfer of Nonresponsibility):
(i) p is true, and no one is (or ever was)
even partly morally responsible for
p;
(ii) p implies q, and no one is (or ever was)
even partly morally responsible for the
fact that p implies q;
Therefore,
(iii) q is true, and no one is (or ever was)
even partly morally responsible for
q.
Defenders of this principle can plausibly
claim that our commitment to it is enshrined
in our inferential practices, and that the
burden of proof falls squarely on those who
wish to reject it, even if no explicit defense
of it is available.
|
|
