List journal issues    
 
 
Home List journal issues Table of contents Subscribe to APQ

Article

Volume 47 • Number 3

July 2010



 

 

Against Logical Versions of the Direct Argument: A New Counterexample


by Seth Shabo


In An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen (1983) presented an intuitively compelling inference principle that has come to be known as "Transfer NR" (Transfer of Nonresponsibility):

(i) p is true, and no one is (or ever was) even partly morally responsible for p;
(ii) p implies q, and no one is (or ever was) even partly morally responsible for the fact that p implies q;

Therefore,

(iii) q is true, and no one is (or ever was) even partly morally responsible for q.
Defenders of this principle can plausibly claim that our commitment to it is enshrined in our inferential practices, and that the burden of proof falls squarely on those who wish to reject it, even if no explicit defense of it is available.


view PDF
 

 

 

 
Home | Issue Index
 
© 2010 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Content in American Philosophical Quarterly is intended for personal, noncommercial use only. You may not reproduce, publish, distribute, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, modify, create derivative works from, display, or in any way exploit the American Philosophical Quarterly database in whole or in part without the written permission of the copyright holder.

American Philosophical Quarterly is published by the University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications.

ISSN: 2152-1123