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A Neglected Way of Begging the Question
by Peter Kung and Masahiro Yamada
Some arguments beg the question. Question-begging arguments are bad arguments
and cannot increase the level of justification
one has for the conclusion. Question-begging
arguments, unlike some other bad arguments,
need not suffer the problem of having unjustified
premises. Even if the premises are
justified and even if the premises entail the
conclusion, a question-begging argument
fails to have any force when it comes to increasing
one's justification for the conclusion.
For example, many regard Moore's famous
response to skepticism as a question-begging
argument:
1. I have hands . . . via perception
2. If I have hands, then I am not a handless
brain in a vat
3. I am not a handless brain in a vat . . .
from 1 and 2, modus ponens
What about this piece of reasoning makes
many feel uneasy? Nonskeptics will agree
that Moore is justified in believing (1). They
will also agree that he is justified in believing
(2). In fact, under normal circumstances
there will be no dispute that Moore knows the
premises. The premises entail the conclusion
and Moore knows this, too. In other words,
the argument is sound, and is known to be
sound. Yet many feel the argument begs the
question. Why?
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