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Volume 46 • Number 3

July 2009



On (Not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: An Argument Against Endurantism

by Jiri Benovsky

My neighbor Cyrano has a big nose. My other neighbor Pinocchio also has a big nose. There are objects that have properties, and these two objects seem to have the same one—having a big nose. Any theory of objects and their having of properties has to accommodate this claim, which is the basic intuition that is a starting point for the metaphysical debate about objects and properties. Some views do it by accepting that the property of having a big nose that Cyrano and Pinocchio have is literally and numerically the very same, while other views do it by denying that the properties are numerically and literally the same. Both, however, agree on two points : (i) two objects can "share the same property" in some relevant sense (even if it is only, say, in virtue of them being exactly similar tropes instead of being universals), and (ii) Cyrano and Pinocchio themselves, being objects and not properties, are not shareable in any sense. This is the basic distinction between objects and properties.

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ISSN: 2152-1123